“You’re Not Gonna Reach My Telephone”— The Resurgence of the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement by Banko, Tammie Beassie
SMU Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 2 Article 6
2018
“You’re Not Gonna Reach My Telephone”— The
Resurgence of the Fourth Amendment’s
Particularity Requirement
Tammie Beassie Banko
Southern Methodist University, tbeassie@mail.smu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tammie Beassie Banko, “You’re Not Gonna Reach My Telephone”— The Resurgence of the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement,
71 SMU L. Rev. 575 (2018)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol71/iss2/6





TO determine whether a state action violates the Fourth Amend-ment, the Supreme Court employs a balancing test, weighing onthe one hand “the degree to which [the action] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the pro-
motion of legitimate governmental interests” on the other hand.1 How-
ever, in an era in which a catalogue of a person’s GPS locations, text
messages, emails, Google searches, banking information, personal notes,
and grocery lists—potentially anything police would need to corroborate
a crime—can be seized in one small cellular device, the scales seem to
instantly dive, not merely tip, in favor of governmental interests. This is,
in part, because officers seeking a warrant to search for and seize
cellphones have had an easy case to make before a magistrate: (1) I have
probable cause to believe X committed a crime; (2) almost every person
owns a cellphone; (3) most criminals use cellphones to communicate and
conspire; (4) X is a person and therefore probably owns a cellphone; and
(5) evidence of his involvement in this alleged crime is likely within his
phone inside his home. On this seemingly logical basis, a “valid” warrant
to seize any cellphone would issue for any person suspected of commit-
ting any crime—a notion that the Fourth Amendment should not toler-
ate. The D.C. Circuit agrees.
In United States v. Griffith, the D.C. Circuit rightly held that the mere
ubiquity of cellphones, coupled with officers’ subjective knowledge of
their potential use in criminal transactions, is insufficiently particular
under the Fourth Amendment for a warrant to issue.2 Further, the court’s
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1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[W]e generally determine
whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.’”).
2. United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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break with other circuits and academics’ recommendations in decidedly
invalidating overseizure of electronic devices represents a strong victory
for personal privacy and restores force to the particularity requirement in
the digital age. Finally, the court’s refusal to apply the good-faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule to save a facially deficient warrant adds teeth
to its ruling, reminding officers that failure to meet the particularity re-
quirement may not cure the invalid warrant or save the fruits of the
search.
In January 2013, police were investigating a gang-related homicide.3
Video footage displayed the getaway car circling the crime scene.4 Of-
ficers suspected Ezra Griffith, a known gang member, to be the driver.5
More than a year after the murder, officers sought a warrant to search the
apartment Griffith shared with his girlfriend in hopes of obtaining a cell
phone that would connect him to the murder.6 The application requested
authority to seize “all electronic devices to include, but not limited to
cellular telephone(s), computer(s), electronic tablet(s), devices capable of
storing digital images (to include, but not limited to, PDAs, CDs, DVD’s
[and] jump/zip drives)” as well as “evidence of ownership of such
devices.”7
The portion of the affidavit supporting search and seizure of a cell
phone was solely supported by the officer’s personal experience and con-
jecture. The officer asserted that “gang/crew members involved in crimi-
nal activity maintain regular contact with each other, even when they are
arrested or incarcerated, and that they often stay advised and share intel-
ligence about their activities through cell phones and other electronic
communication devices and the Internet to include Facebook, Twitter and
E-mail accounts.”8 The affidavit concluded that “aforementioned facts
and circumstances,” coupled with the officer’s “experience and training,”
were sufficient to establish “probable cause to believe that secreted inside
of [the apartment] is evidence relating to the homicide discussed above.”9
The magistrate agreed.10
On January 7, 2013, the officers executed the warrant.11 Officers ob-
served a gun flying out of the window near where Griffith was standing.12
They seized the gun, entered the apartment, and seized “a number of cell
phones.”13 Griffith was charged with possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon.14 He moved to suppress all evidence and challenged the war-
3. Id. at 1268.
4. Id.
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rant as facially invalid because there was no evidence that he owned a cell
phone or that any of the items would be within the apartment prior to
executing the warrant.15 Countering these arguments, the government ar-
gued that the ubiquity of cell phones was sufficient to establish probable
cause that Griffith owned a cell phone, that the cell phone would contain
evidence, and that the device would be within the home.16 The govern-
ment alternatively requested the application of the good-faith excep-
tion.17 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, applied the good-
faith exception, and failed to decide whether the warrant was facially in-
valid.18 Griffith was convicted of felonious possession of a firearm.19
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the denial of Griffith’s motion to
suppress and vacated his conviction.20 Challenging other circuit rulings
and many courts’ interpretations of Riley v. California,21 the D.C. Circuit
held that “the general pervasiveness of cell phones affords an inadequate
basis” for establishing probable cause to search a home and seize elec-
tronics within unless there is evidence given to believe the specific person
in question (1) owns a phone and (2) has the phone within the home to be
searched in compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity re-
quirement.22 Finding otherwise would “verge on authorizing a search of a
person’s home almost anytime there is probable cause to suspect her of a
crime.”23 Further, the court chastised the overbreadth of the warrant be-
cause it allowed officers to seize all electronic devices, which are “other-
wise lawful objects,” even if they affirmatively knew that the devices
belonged to Griffith’s girlfriend or the child within, both of whom were of
no legal interest to the government.24 The court refused to apply the
good-faith exception as a result.25
The court’s ruling was a surprising and warranted blow to many courts’
erroneous tendency to allow officers’ subjective knowledge and experi-
ence to substitute for the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement
when issuing warrants. Many lower courts across circuits uphold warrants
to seize cell phones based solely on officer “knowledge and experience”
that the alleged crimes under investigation involved digital communica-
tions without any specific knowledge that the particular suspect had a cell
phone. For example, in United States v. Reed, the court upheld a seizure
of a cell phone pursuant to a search warrant based solely on the “general
knowledge [the officer] has acquired about controlled substance traffick-
15. Id.
16. See id. at 1272.
17. Id. at 1270.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1281.
21. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (holding that cell phones main-
tain such a heightened expectation of privacy that officers must obtain an additional war-
rant to search the contents of a phone after seizure).
22. Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1275–76.
23. Id. at 1275.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1279.
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ers through his training, experience, and participation in investiga-
tions.”26 Because traffickers “commonly maintain addresses or telephone
numbers related to their activities in ‘electronic/digital devices/media,’”
the court held that there was probable cause to support the warrant.27
This is not an isolated incident; rather, this is common practice. The
district court (affirmed by the Fourth Circuit) in United States v. Harris
upheld a warrant on bare assumptions, citing several instances upon
which courts in a variety of circuits have upheld warrants solely based on
officers’ general knowledge of how criminals operate with digital commu-
nications without any particular factual reason for believing the alleged
criminal himself had a cell phone and without any description of the de-
vices sought to be seized.28 It appears that courts, desiring the potential
wealth of evidence stored in a cellphone, turn a blind eye to the particu-
larity requirement when reviewing warrants for electronic devices.
Courts have gone further, finding that “cell phones are such common
and integral tools of the criminal trade that their incriminating nature is
immediately apparent and therefore their seizure falls within the plain
view exception to the warrant requirement.”29 Thus, regardless of
whether an officer has done any level of due diligence in determining
whether the suspect even owns a phone, the ubiquity of cell phones plus
officers’ general knowledge appears to have been sufficient for courts to
uphold warrants that clearly fail the particularity requirement. Under this
rationale, should officers fail to include these electronic devices within
the warrant application, it appears that they could enter a home pursuant
to an otherwise valid warrant and grab a cell phone charging on the
kitchen counter. After all, the criminal nature of a cellphone is “immedi-
ately apparent.”
Despite courts’ selective blindness in issuing and upholding warrants,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is clear: particularity is not an optional
suggestion but an explicit requirement stated within the text of the
amendment itself that is supported by years of Supreme Court decisions.
The Constitution requires that “no warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”30 The
text of the amendment appears to be conjunctive, including a dual re-
quirement: (1) probable cause, that is, “fair probability”31 to believe that
26. United States v. Reed, No. 2:13-CR-29-1, 2013 WL 5503691, at *3 (D. Vt. Oct. 2,
2013).
27. Id.
28. United States v. Harris, No. 3:15CR170, 2016 WL 1441382, at *11–12 (E.D. Va.
Apr. 11, 2016), aff’d, 688 F. App’x 223 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 436 (2017).
29. Id. at *12.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (“The task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
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evidence will be found, and (2) particularity.32 The “fair probability”
based on the ubiquity of cellphones only partially satisfies the require-
ments for a valid warrant. The second requirement, particularity, de-
mands a bit more than common knowledge that people own cell phones
and that cell phones contain valuable information. Particularity demands
a description of the “things to be seized.”33
As the D.C. Circuit held in Griffith, “the requirement of particularity is
closely tied to the requirement of probable cause.”34 In this way, the fail-
ure of particularity tarnishes instances where there may very well be a
“fair probability” that evidence will be found, as is the case with ubiqui-
tous items like cell phones. Therefore, the court correctly rejected the
government’s proposition that because nearly everyone now carries a cell
phone, and because a phone frequently contains all sorts of information
about the owner’s daily activities, a person’s suspected involvement in a
crime ordinarily justifies searching her home for any cell phones, regard-
less of whether there is any indication that she in fact owns one.35
Further, the court’s analysis challenges decisions that have leaned so
heavily toward government interest and police expediency that they view
electronic devices as almost per se criminal tools. The court correctly
notes that the devices sought were “otherwise lawful objects,” not “con-
traband items like ‘weapons [or] narcotics.’”36 The court explicitly deems
cell phones as “innocuous” items that require care to ensure that the
search is “conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions
upon privacy.”37 Because the home is the “first among equals,” “[t]he
general pervasiveness of cell phones affords an inadequate basis for erod-
ing that core protection.”38 Consequently, an officer must state with par-
ticularity his reason to believe that (1) the suspect owns a cell phone, (2)
the phone contains incriminating information, and (3) the phone will be
found within the home. Any less may satisfy the first requirement of “fair
probability” but will (at least in the D.C. Circuit) fail the second require-
ment of particularity.
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion also cuts against other circuits’ propensity to
uphold, if not encourage, warrants that allow overseizure in the digital
device realm. As noted by Professor Adam M. Gershowitz, “particularity
challenges are often made in computer search warrant cases,” but “they
ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.”).
32. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (“The fact that the application ade-
quately described the ‘things to be seized’ does not save the warrant from its facial invalid-
ity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the
supporting documents.”) (emphasis in original).
33. Id.
34. United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
35. Id. at 1274.
36. Id. at 1276.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1275.
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are rarely successful.”39 As shown in these cases, “the particularity guar-
antee has provided little protection to defendants in the digital con-
text.”40 The two rare instances in which a court may invalidate warrants
in the face of a particularity challenge are the following: (1) where the
warrant fails to state the crime or fails to state a sufficient nexus between
the alleged crime and the evidence sought, and (2) where a warrant uses
overbroad language.41 However, despite the few decisions that sustain
these Fourth Amendment challenges to problematic warrants, many
“search warrants authorize extremely broad searches that resemble gen-
eral warrants,” a few are invalidated, and many are saved by the good-
faith exception.42
Some scholars agree with courts upholding overbroad warrants, argu-
ing that overbroad search warrants are a necessary evil in the digital age.
Professor Orin Kerr has explicitly stated that “courts should not impose
limits at the physical search stage.”43 Admitting that “allowing a full
seizure [of electronics] at the physical search stage technically permits an
overseizure,” Kerr argues that there is “no reasonable alternative given
the time-consuming nature of electronic searches.”44 He likens a digital
search to foraging through a haystack in search of a needle.45 So, rather
than have officers take “weeks or longer” on site to determine whether
the device in question even belongs to the suspect, the government is
justified in seizing the whole haystack.46 It seems to be the only option
when an agent might find “a dozen computers, five backup hard drives,
ten flash drives, and 100 CD-ROMs.”47 It would be impractical for of-
ficers to linger in a citizen’s home determining which devices fall within
the scope of the search and which do not.48 Instead, seize the day—and
all the devices!
While the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that there may be circumstances
in which a brief overseizure may be necessary to determine the device’s
relevance to the investigation, such as in cases where officers learn of a
suspect’s phone usage without direct description of the cell phone
model,49 the court refused to accept a warrant’s facial overbreadth where
there was no attempt to restrict the search. The court chastised the war-
39. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Par-
ticularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 600 (2016). Note that this article is
largely about warrants to search the contents of cell phones rather than physical over-
seizure of devices. However, Gershowitz’s analysis also applies to courts’ approach to over-
broad search warrants.
40. Id. at 599.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 600.
43. Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restric-




47. Id. at 12.
48. See id.
49. United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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rant in this case as failing to “establish probable cause to suspect that any
cell phones or other electronic devices belonging to Griffith and contain-
ing incriminating information would be found in the apartment,” yet
turning around and authorizing “seizure of all cell phones and electronic
devices, without regard to ownership.”50 The court could not tolerate the
notion that the warrant as stated allowed officers to seize all cell phones
even if officers had every reason to know that any given phone, in fact,
did not belong to Griffith. Instead, the “warrant must be tailored to the
justifications for entering the home,” thereby demonstrating some at-
tempt to limit “the scope of permissible seizure to devices owned by Grif-
fith, or linked to the shooting.”51 While other courts have implied a
limitation where an overbroad warrant fails to do so, such as reading the
warrant in light of the crime alleged, the D.C. Circuit held that the lack of
limitation on the face of the warrant rendered it impermissibly
overbroad.
The court appears to give primacy where the Fourth Amendment
does—to privacy rather than expediency. Despite Professor Kerr’s assess-
ment that the court got it wrong because “overseizure is necessary” and
because “courts should allow it because you never know where the elec-
tronic evidence might be,”52 the D.C. Circuit did not quite place a ban on
overseizure where necessary. Instead, the court placed a prohibition on
general warrants that refuse even a paltry attempt at limiting the scope of
a predictably overbroad search. The D.C. Circuit merely required compli-
ance with the Fourth Amendment: a particular basis for knowledge that
the alleged criminal has a cell phone, a description of it, and reason to
know that the cell phone will be within the home.53 In the alternative, if
ideal particularity (such as a description of the specific devices) cannot be
achieved, officers must include some form of limitation within the war-
rant to keep from obtaining free-rein authority to seize even things that
obviously do not involve the person or the crime in question.54 In this
regard, the ruling balances, rather than tips, the scale by allowing officers
to overseize electronics where necessary so long as there is a limitation to
protect individual privacy. This seems to harmonize with the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment rather than allow blanket overseizure without so
much as an attempt to circumscribe its intrusion on others within the
home.
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Griffith is undoubtedly controversial but
not because it is legally erroneous. Quite the opposite, the ruling restores
balance to warrant practices that have gone far afield from the Fourth
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Orin S. Kerr, D.C. Circuit Forbids Seizing All Electronic Storage Devices in Com-




53. See Griffith, 867 F.3d at 1277.
54. See id.
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Amendment’s requirements and protections for individual privacy. In an
era of digital pervasiveness, the Griffith court reminds law enforcement
that there are constitutional limits to the searches they request. This may
require officers to do more reconnaissance on the front-end: observe the
suspect, ensure a factual basis for the searches to be executed, limit the
scope, and demonstrate deference for the privacy interests inevitably in-
vaded. The court makes it very clear that the preference for practicality
over privacy has come to a screeching halt. Particularity is a constitutional
requirement, and where officers or magistrates ignore this reality, not
even the broadly applied good-faith exception will cure the deficiency.
